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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to establish what lessons might be available to the English health care
sector following enactment of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 from the Dutch
experience of introducing market competition into health care via a mandatory health
insurance scheme implemented by for-proﬁt insurance companies. The existence of the
Beveridge NHS model in England, and a Bismarckian insurance system in The Nether-
lands perhaps suggest that a comparison of the two countries is at best limited, and rein-
forced by the different Enthoven-inspired competitive models each has adopted.
However, we contend that there are positive and negative issues arising from introduc-
ing competition into health care—, e.g. concerns about equity and beneﬁts of efﬁcien-
cies—which go beyond national boundaries and different systems and reﬂect the global
paradigm shift towards the use of market forces in previously non-market areas such as
health. The article examines the situation in England following the HSCA 2012 and
The Netherlands following the 2006 reforms before analysing two areas of common
ground: the focus in both countries on competition on quality (as opposed to price)
and integrated care, which is assuming ever greater signiﬁcance. We suggest that our
combined insights (as a health lawyer and competition lawyer respectively) coupled
with a comparative approach create a novel contribution to current calls for a wider
public debate about the real role of markets in health care over and above simple charac-
terisation as a force for good or bad.
KEYWORDS: English NHS, Health and Social Care Act 2012, Health Care Regulation,
Health Insurance, Monitor, The Netherlands
I . INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA 2012) in England has
proved controversial for ofﬁcially applying the principles of competition law to the
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English NHS. As such, it not only formalises the development of market forces in the
English NHS (in evidence since Enthoven’s conception of ‘internal markets’ from the
late 1980s), but also reﬂects a contentious global paradigm shift regarding the use of
competition and market forces in health care which polarises opinion. On the one
hand, competition is increasingly seen as a solution to the problems of rising costs and
increasing demand. On the other hand, competition in health care (and other social
services) is seen as fundamentally corrosive, undermining relationships between both
patients and practitioners, and between citizens and the State, even striking at the heart
of the basic human right to health care.
This belief in market forces is not restricted to England. Other countries have
already experimented with market competition in health care. In 2006, the Dutch
health care system shifted towards a universal basic health insurance scheme for the
entire population. However, unlike most universal schemes, the Dutch system is
implemented by multiple private health insurers. Although based on the principles of
competition in that it allows providers and insurers to compete for consumers, it is
also highly regulated to ensure the allocation of essential care according to need.
The Dutch system is now an interesting marriage of tensions because in moving to
extend insurance to all citizens, it simultaneously introduced a much greater role for
the private sector in terms of relying on competing private for-proﬁt health insurers.
Although liberalising and privatising health care may be justiﬁable for economic and
ﬁnancial reasons (such as cost reduction, efﬁciency improvements, and innovation),
there are serious concerns about whether a system of regulated competition and
emerging private health arrangements respects the basic human right of equal access
to health care services. From a human rights perspective, combining competition and
private initiatives on health care markets with restrictive measures inspired by social
values (e.g. solidarity and equity) appears to be an extremely difﬁcult exercise. For
example, as we will discuss further below, several market-driven policies have under-
mined the right to equal access (e.g. preferential treatment arrangements, voluntary
deductibles, and discounts for group insurance schemes).
At ﬁrst glance, examining what England can learn from the Dutch experience is at
best limited in view of their very different health care systems (i.e. the Beveridge
national health service funded by general taxation and a Bismarckian model of health
insurance, respectively) and different Enthoven-inspired competitive models (‘inter-
nal markets’ based on a purchaser/provider split in the English NHS, and ‘managed
competition’ which emphasises consumers in The Netherlands).
However, the comparison is valid because both countries are confronted with
similar challenges and threats of replacing non-market values in health care and the
corrosive effects of markets on solidarity and equity in health care access.1 The com-
parison therefore ﬁts in with wider global considerations of the proper role of markets
and where the limits lie.
More concrete lessons drawn from this comparison are limited to areas where
there is common ground, for instance the enhancing of consumer choice by introduc-
ing competition on quality instead of price, and integrated care initiatives.
1 As highlighted by, eg, MJ Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Allen Lane, UK
2012) 7.
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This article draws on insights from a health lawyer who focuses on the right to
health care and a competition lawyer concentrating on health care to examine health
care competition in both The Netherlands and England. This approach reveals
various constraints impeding the ability of health care systems to address health
inequalities relevant to policy-makers when marketising health care.
I I . HEALTH CARE COMPETITION IN ENGLAND AND
THE HCSA 2012 REFORMS
This section provides an overview of the competitive mechanisms which have devel-
oped within the English NHS and how the HSCA 2012 builds on these. It also identi-
ﬁes some areas of concern, although more detailed consideration of the effects of the
HSCA 2012 on speciﬁc groups and the overall effect of the Act are considered else-
where in this issue.2
In England, controversy about competition in health care has effectively centred
on the introduction of market practices to the NHS, as distinct from the market for
private healthcare (PH) and supplementary private medical insurance (PMI). The
use of market mechanisms within the NHS proves controversial for a variety of
reasons, and the questions these raise about accountability and consideration of exclu-
sively economic concerns are of most relevance here. With regard to accountability,
different networks of relationships (and thus legal rights)— i.e. between citizens and
government, as opposed to consumer and competition authority—are reinforced by
the fact that PH and PMI are overseen by the Ofﬁce of Fair Trading (OFT), whereas
the NHS is overseen ultimately by the Secretary of State for Health and subordinate
bodies.
However, the supplementary nature of PH and PMI in England (as opposed to the
mandatory private health insurance in The Netherlands) arguably belies its signiﬁcance
in the connection between PH and the NHS which developed following the evolution
of NHS ‘internal markets’ (Enthoven’s conception of a purchaser/provider split3)
introduced by the Conservative government in the early 1990s. Although New Labour
initially distanced itself from this model, the changes it implemented (e.g. emphasising
choice policies, introducing greater private sector involvement via Independent Sector
Treatment Centres (ITSCs),4 and establishing Foundation Trusts (FTs)5) led to well-
embedded NHS managerialism becoming an effective means of harnessing and opera-
tionalising market ideology.6 The combined Conservative and New Labour efforts
established the four types of relationship which currently exist.7 These range from
exclusively state-funded provision (e.g. an NHS patient treated in an NHS facility), to
2 See contributions by, eg, Newdick and Stirton.
3 A Enthoven, ‘Internal Market Reform of the British National Health Service’ (1991) 10 (3) Health Affairs
60–70.
4 ITSCs offer certain treatments to NHS patients.
5 NHS bodies with greater independence from government and ﬁnancial and commercial responsibilities.
6 A Cribb, ‘Organizational Reform and Health-care Goods: Concerns about Marketization in the UK NHS’
(2008) J Med Philos 33: 221–240.
7 O Odudu, ‘Competition Law and the National Health Service’ (Competition Bulletin: Competition Law Views
from Blackstone Chambers, 8 October 2012) <http://competitionbulletin.com/2012/10/08/competition-law-
and-the-national-health-service/> accessed 28 March 2014.
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exclusively private provision (e.g. a PMI patient treated in a PH facility).8 In between
these two extremes are private funding and public provision (e.g. contracts for leasing
buildings and land)9 and public funding and private provision (e.g. an NHS patient
treated in a PH facility). Although such a typology may raise questions of whether and
when competition law applies, these have been considered redundant10 by virtue of
the deﬁnitions of EU law11 (and thus national competition law).
Part 3 of the HSCA 2012 establishes Monitor as the economic regulator for health
care12 and enshrines the application of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98) by grant-
ing Monitor concurrent powers with the OFT13 regarding anti-competitive agree-
ments and abuse of dominance.14 These concurrent powers extend to Market
Investigations under the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA 02),15 but not to the merger provi-
sions as Monitor has an advisory role regarding NHS FT mergers.16 Monitor’s com-
petition role extends beyond this to safeguarding choice and preventing
anticompetitive behaviour which is not in patients’ interests17 and enforcing the
licence condition prohibiting anti-competitive practices when assessing new FTs.18
This formal recognition and application of CA 98, coupled with the commitment to
‘competitive neutrality’19 with a ‘fair playing ﬁeld’ for public, private, and voluntary
sector providers of NHS care20 might therefore be understood as a logical—if not
universally desirable—conclusion of the competition developments in the NHS to
date.
A further controversial aspect of the HSCA 2012 is the development of Clinical
Commissioning Groups (CCGs), which follow previous initiatives21 in seeing GPs
assuming commissioning functions. These raise concerns regarding potential conﬂict
of interests22 as the purchaser and provider functions are conﬂated. As CCGs are not
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 O Odudu, ‘Are State Owned Healthcare Providers that Are Funded by General Taxation Undertakings
Subject to Competition Law?’ (2011) 32 (5) ECLR 231–41.
11 This is explored by Szyszczak and Van de Gronden in this issue, so further discussion is beyond the scope
of this article.
12 An extension of its previous role as independent regulator of NHS FTs.
13 Subject to exceptions, eg, the OFT has sole responsibility for making regulations and issuing guidance
regarding the application of the Competition Act 1998 for the economy as a whole. Explanatory Notes to
the Health and Social Care Act 2012, para 712.
14 For example the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions of CA 98. HSCA 2012, s 72.
15 EA 02, Pt 4. HSCA 2012, s 73.
16 HSCA 2012, s 79(5).
17 Ibid.
18 Monitor, ‘About Monitor’s Licensing Conditions’ <http://www.monitor.gov.uk/regulating-health-care-
providers-commissioners/licensing-providers/about-the-licence-conditions> accessed 28 March 2014.
19 O Odudu, above, n 10.
20 <http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/regulating-health-care-providers-commissioners/fair-playing-ﬁeld-
%E2%80%93-the-beneﬁt-nhs-patients> accessed 27 March 2014.
21 For an overview of these, see, eg, R Mannion, ‘General Practitioner-led Commissioning in the NHS: Pro-
gress, Prospects and Pitfalls’ (2011) 97(1) Br Med Bull 7–15.
22 As already recognised by NHS England in the document NHS Commissioning Board, ‘Code of Conduct:
Managing conﬂicts of interest where GP practices are potential providers of CCG-commissioned services’
October 2012. <http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/c-of-c-conﬂicts-of-interest.
pdf> accessed 25 August 2013.
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explicitly included in the competition provisions of the HSCA 2012, these are beyond
the scope of this article,23 as is Monitor’s role beyond its competition duties.
However, it is worth noting that Monitor has explicit duties to enable integrated care,
despite apparent contradictions between this and competition.
As acknowledged above, further concerns arising from the HSCA 2012 focus on
accountability and equity of access.
First, reliance on the competition authority (OFT) and the health care regulator
(Monitor) as independent bodies raises questions about the Secretary of State’s
accountability with regard to health care provision and the recourse available to
patients (as citizens) as a result. It has been suggested that the Secretary of State’s
accountability is threatened by the HSCA 2012 reforms for three reasons: they make
the relationship between the minister and the NHS more complex; they create
opaque networks of non-statutory bodies which may inﬂuence NHS decision-making;
and (especially in relation to competition) they ‘juridify’ policy changes as matters of
law.24 This process of ‘juridiﬁcation’ can be understood in terms of traditional political
policy decisions being increasingly determined by the courts.25 Certainly, it has been
suggested in assessments of recent patient and public involvement policies that the
HSCA 2012 reforms represent a retrograde step in opportunities for patients and the
public to hold accountable those who plan and deliver health services in England.26
The recent successful challenge by local residents to the Secretary of State’s plans to
reduce services available at Lewisham Hospital in order to improve the performance
of a failing NHS trust27 may offer some comfort, but arguably cannot assuage these
concerns comprehensively.
Secondly, much of the public controversy relating to the HSCA 2012 echoes
Aneurin Bevan’s explanation of abuse of the NHS as attempts to marry the incompati-
ble principles of private acquisitiveness with a public service.28 Although a detailed
discussion of the difﬁculties of attempting to reconcile the two is beyond the scope of
this article, it is worth noting here that empirical evidence of greater use of private
providers is mixed and varies depending on the group in question. For example, the
experience of clinicians relocating from the NHS to ITSCs suggests that although
some improvements might legitimise the role of the private sector, doubts remain
about the commercialisation of services, the motives of managers, and the impact of
clinical roles and capabilities.29 The beneﬁts delivered by for-proﬁt businesses which
23 For a good overview, see ACL Davies, ‘This Time, it’s for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012’
(2013) 76(3) MLR 564–88.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 J Tritter and M Koivusalo, ‘Undermining Patient and Public Engagement and Limiting Its Impact: The
Consequences of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 on Collective Patient and Public Involvement’
(2013) 16 Health Expectations 115–18.
27 The Queen (on the application of London Borough of Lewisham, Save Lewisham Hospital Campaign Limited) v
Secretary of State for Health, Trust Special Administrator Appointed to South London Hospitals NHS Trust
[2013] EWHC 2381 (Admin).
28 A Bevan, ‘A Free Health Service’, in A Bevan (ed) In Place of Fear (Quartet Books Limited, London 1976)
108.
29 J Waring and S Bishop, ‘Going Private: Clinicians’ Experience of Working in UK Independent Sector
Treatment Centres’ (2012) 104 Health Policy 172–178.
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tender to provide NHS services appear less obvious. Instead, risks for nurses (e.g. job
losses, changes to working terms and conditions, and reduced inﬂuence as consultants
assume a dominant role in commissioning)30 have been acknowledged31 and ethical
concerns have been identiﬁed in that, in operating as businesses, private companies’
ability to provide consistent care is compromised.32
Thirdly, the inability of general competition and merger rules to explicitly consider
anything other than economic issues is of concern, as is the acknowledged inability of
markets to achieve an equitable provision of health care.33 The apparent exclusion of
what might be termed ‘public interests’ regarding equity in the provision of, and
access to, health care is clear from the general merger regime of EA02.34 The counter-
balance to a ﬁnding of ‘signiﬁcant lessening of competition’ is found in ‘relevant cus-
tomer beneﬁts’,35 deﬁned under section 30(1)(a) EA02 as lower prices, higher
quality, or greater choice of goods or services. This category was intended to be inter-
preted strictly; however the Explanatory Notes to the HSCA 2012 appeared to
suggest that Monitor may take a more relaxed approach and interpret ‘relevant cus-
tomer beneﬁts’ as ‘likely costs and beneﬁts to patients’36 in reﬂection of terminology
used by its predecessor (the NHS Cooperation and Competition Panel (NHS CCP))
which considered the costs and beneﬁts to patients and taxpayers of proposed NHS
mergers.
The proposed merger between the Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospi-
tals NHS Foundation Trust and the Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (the
‘Dorset FTs merger’) was the ﬁrst to be assessed under the EA02 regime following
the HSCA 2012. It was blocked by the Competition Commission (CC) in October
201337 for a lack of relevant customer beneﬁts to offset the restriction of patient
choice which exists between the two hospitals, and the potential loss of incentive to
compete to maintain or improve quality to attract patients. Although the merger
parties had revised their proposed beneﬁts after these were initially rejected by
Monitor, the CC ultimately found that these were inadequate to counterbalance a sig-
niﬁcant lessening of competition which would result from the merger in nineteen
elective inpatient services and thirty-six outpatient specialities. In contrast to the
Explanatory Notes to the HSCA 2012, this decision suggests that relevant customer
30 A Moore, ‘In the Market for Change’ (2012) 26 (33) Nursing Stand.
31 Ibid.
32 L Frith, ‘The NHS and Market Forces in Healthcare: The Need for Organisational Ethics’ (2013) 39 J
Med E 17–21.
33 P Allen, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Limits of Market Based Reforms in the English NHS’ (2013) 13
(Suppl 1) BMC Health Serv Res S1.
34 EA 02, Pt 3.
35 A mechanism available to both the CC and the OFT. OFT, ‘Merger Assessment Guidelines’ Septem-
ber 2010. <http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/publications/lw_mergers/#.UzUyu1LW_Mw>
accessed 28 March 2014.
36 Explanatory Notes to the Health and Social Care Act 2012, para 740.
37 Competition Commission, The Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust/
Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. A report on the anticipated merger of the The Royal Bournemouth
and Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust/Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust,
17 October 2013. <http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/
2013/royal-bournemouth-and-christchurch-poole/131017_ﬁnal_report.pdf > accessed 28 March 2014.
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beneﬁts are to be narrowly construed. The CC has arguably further raised this thresh-
old by clarifying that ‘customers’ are ultimately patients, not commissioners (CCGs),
or shareholders (in view of the status of FTs as public beneﬁt corporations38).
The CC’s decision in the Dorset FTs merger case appears signiﬁcant for poten-
tially allowing scope to consider equitable aspects and underscoring its cooperation
with the OFT and Monitor in placing patient interests at the heart of the merger
review process.39 However, the effects of the changes heralded by the HSCA 2012
have yet to be fully understood, particularly with regard to applying the competition
law provisions40 to implement a ‘fair playing ﬁeld’ between PH, NHS, and Voluntary
Sector providers.41 It is therefore useful to consider at this early stage the experience
of introducing health care competition in The Netherlands to see if there are speciﬁc
lessons for England.
I I I . HEALTH CARE MARKET REFORMS IN THE NETHERLANDS
Since 2006, confronted with increased health care costs and the need for more efﬁ-
ciency, Dutch government coalitions have introduced several steps towards more
market competition in health care, starting with health insurance reforms, followed by
liberalising the health care providers market and health care tariffs. Before discussing
the outcomes of these reforms, a brief outline of this three-stage approach is included.
A. The Three-Stage Reforms
1. Competitive Social Health Insurance
A main element of the Dutch health care sector reforms is the Zorgverzekeringswet
(Health Insurance Act) (hereafter Zvw),42 which introduced elements of regulated
competition into the health insurance scheme, and replaced the previous health insur-
ance system governed by the Ziekenfondswet (Sickness Funds Act) (hereafter
Zfw).43 Traditionally, health insurance is based on the principles of equal access and
solidarity. The Zvw introduced a compulsory health insurance scheme for the entire
population, carried out by for-proﬁt insurance companies. Health insurance agree-
ments are private law contracts by nature (providing indemnity insurance), and are
therefore based on principles such as freedom of contract. However, the legislation
imposes certain restrictions to protect the principle of equal access to health care.
The prohibition of risk selection by health insurers is one clear example of this.
38 NHS Act 2006, s 43.
39 Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, Competition Commission, Monitor, ‘Ensuring Patients’ Interests are at the Heart of
Assessing Public Hospital Mergers. A Joint Statement from the Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, Competition
Commission and Monitor, 17 October 2013. <http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/assets/
competitioncommission/docs/2013/royal-bournemouth-and-christchurch-poole/131017_oft_cc_monitor_
merger_statement_ﬁnal.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014.
40 The HSCA 2012 provides that Monitor is to have concurrent powers with the OFT to apply the provisions
of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98) regarding anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance (the
‘Chapter I’ and ‘Chapter II’ prohibitions, respectively).
41 Monitor, ‘A Fair Playing Field for the Beneﬁt of NHS Patients: Monitor’s Independent Review for the Sec-
retary of State for Health’, 26 March 2013. <http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/fpfr> accessed 28 March
2014.
42 The Zvw came into force on January 1, 2006 (Ofﬁcial Journal of the State 2005, 358).
43 The Zfw of 15 October 1964.
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In addition, all health insurers must participate in a risk equalisation system, which
ensures that insurers who cover individuals with higher risk proﬁles receive more
funding. Such a levelling mechanism prevents direct and indirect risk selection of the
so-called ‘high’ risk insured (i.e. the chronically ill). Entitlements or beneﬁts covered
by health insurers are deﬁned by law, but contracting parties may agree who will
deliver the insured health services, and where. In the interests of public health,
freedom of contract is non-existent in cases of emergency care and highly specialised
care; by law, health insurers are forced to cover both types of service. These, and
other restrictions of the Zvw’s free contracting principle, reﬂect the tension in pro-
moting market competition while still attempting to ensure solidarity in accessing
health care.
The Zvw provides coverage for essential curative care tested against the criteria of
necessity, proven efﬁcacy, cost effectiveness, and collective or individual responsibil-
ity.44 Under the scheme provided by the Zvw, the insured party may opt for a
beneﬁts-in-kind or reimbursement model, or a combination of both. Although both
models guarantee a standard insurance policy, under the reimbursement model the
insured party has free choice of provider. Under the beneﬁts-in-kind variant, the
insured party is limited to the list of health providers who have entered into contracts
of delivery with the chosen health insurer. In exceptional cases under this model, the
insured party may opt for a non-contracted provider, for example, where there is a
long waiting period. Overall, the concept of choice, i.e. individual choice of provider,
insurer, and insurance policy, as well as the insurer’s choice of provider (arising from
selective contracting), therefore represents a crucial element of the health insurance
market reforms, at least in theory.
2. Deregulating the Health Care Provider Market
The shift towards a competitive private health insurance market is closely linked with
a more liberal hospital admission policy. Prior to 2007, hospital capacity planning was
strictly regulated. The hospital planning process was criticised for its complexity and
lack of ﬂexibility. Major revision occurred in 2007, when the Wet Toelating Zorgin-
stellingen (Law on Health Facilities Admission) (hereafter WTZi) came into force.
The WTZi introduced a shift from central planning towards a decentralised demand-
driven system in which the governmental role is restricted to setting preconditions
which govern hospital planning. These conditions attempt to ensure public interests
such as accessibility, quality, and efﬁciency of inpatient care. As such, the WTZi sets
requirements for hospital admission, organisational structure and management, and
health care governance. The rationale is that consumer demand and market competi-
tion on the health care providers market will determine the required hospital capacity.
Withdrawal of governmental interference in capacity planning was replaced by pro-
moting entrepreneurship.
This will be encouraged by the latest initiative: lifting the ban on for-proﬁt hospi-
tals. In case of inpatient care, so far, a for-proﬁt basis has been prohibited since it
raises concerns about the distribution of dividends funded by public means, and
44 Based on the method for priority-setting by the Dunning Committee ‘Choices in Health Care’ (1991).
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shareholders’ inﬂuence on healthcare decision-making. According to the Minister of
Health, this will be solved by making payments conditional on to a minimum sol-
vency ratio, a 3-year waiting time, and shareholders will have limited powers as con-
cerns strategic decision-making.45 The underlying assumption is that private
investments will strengthen efﬁciency, innovation, and quality in health care. Though
one may question such a market approach, it remains to be seen whether private
investors (e.g. pension funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds) are interested in
investing in ‘corporate’ hospitals.
3. Liberalising Health Care Tariffs
The ﬁnal stage of the health care sector reforms included a gradual shift towards
freely negotiated prices. In competitive markets, price is based on the equilibrium
between demand and supply. Since health care is for many reasons a unique market,
price regulation was not removed entirely. Governmental supervision on health care
price-setting is delegated to the Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (Netherlands Health
Care Authority) (hereafter NZa). The NZa supervises both health care providers and
insurers, to ensure that they provide good and efﬁcient health care to consumers. It
also has statutory responsibilities under the Wet Marktordening Gezondheidszorg
(Health Care (Market Regulation) Act) (hereafter Wmg) for tariff regulation, setting
prices (maximum and bandwidth rates), and budgets.46
For several years, the goal of a free market was aspirational, since the NZa deﬁned
the tariffs of important inpatient health services. This tariff is calculated using ‘hospital
products’, divided into ‘diagnosis-treatment-combinations’ (hereafter DTCs), which
are based on all types of procedures used during hospital treatment. All DTCs are
exhaustively assigned to one of two lists—List A or List B. List A DTCs have ﬁxed
national prices, whereas List B prices result from negotiations between health insurers
and hospitals. Since insurers are not obliged to contract with all hospitals, price nego-
tiation strengthened market competition for List B DTCs which gradually increased
to seventy per cent in 2012.47 Although the introduction of DTCs encouraged insur-
ers to contract selectively with hospitals, in practice all hospitals have entered into
contracts since insurers fear the loss of reputation if they restrict consumer choice,
and consequently, the threat of switching customers.
B. Outcomes of Health Care Market Competition
Since the 2006 health care reforms, it has been a research subject for various disci-
plines. However, one may question the success thus far of the aims of cost contain-
ment, more efﬁciency and maintaining equal access to health care for the entire
population. Despite the complexity of the reforms, some preliminary results from
research studies will be discussed focusing on the effects on accessibility of health care
and freedom of choice as core values in the reform process, as well as insurers and
providers.
45 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary proceedings) 2012/13, 33168 nos 2 and 7.
46 The functions of the NZa correspond largely to those of Monitor’s predecessor, the NHS CCP.
47 Hospital DTCs have now been replaced by a new classiﬁcation known as ‘DOTs’.
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1. Health Insurance: Retreat From Equal Access
Although the Zvw makes a commitment to equality in health care, in reality the Neth-
erlands has retreated from that principle since 2006, which has caused a change in the
public’s commitment to equitable access. Prior to 2006, policy proposals that
restricted access had no or little chance of assent and, consequently, were never
placed on the policy agenda. Yet in March 2006, the Diaconessenhuis hospital in
Leiden announced that it had entered into an agreement with a health insurer, Zorg
& Zekerheid, and that waiting times for a cataract operation for its policyholders
would be shorter than for patients with other health insurers, and this development
drew little attention.48 Similarly, the Groene Hart hospital in Woerden launched a
plan for a ‘business club’ giving preferential treatment to workers.49 Previously,
however, such preferential treatment in the provision of medically necessary care
would have caused more of a furore.50
Another example of the retreat from equitable access to health services is an agree-
ment between the Kennemer Gasthuis hospital in Haarlem and a mediation agency.
It was agreed that patients/employees would receive necessary health care ahead of
other patients in need. In its assessment, the NZa concluded that such commercial
mediation is forbidden by law.51 Its reasoning was merely based on technical legal
arguments, i.e. that charging commercial tariffs infringes Dutch tariff regulations. On
the merits, however, the NZa welcomes such initiatives for efﬁciency (better use of
existing capacity) and quality reasons (reduced waiting times). The key problem of
prohibiting risk selection by providers based on ﬁnancial incentives instead of medical
needs was not deemed to fall within the remit of the NZa. Unfortunately, the NZa
ignored the fact that risk selection based on non-medical needs is inherent to com-
mercial mediation. Otherwise, there is no incentive for health providers to treat spe-
ciﬁc patients ﬁrst.
Advocates of preferential treatment schemes claim that an increase in supply will
ultimately lead to an overall improvement in the fulﬁlment of health care needs. As
the chair of the board of directors of Diaconessenhuis hospital stated, while it is true
that the health insurer’s clients would receive care more quickly, this would also
beneﬁt the patients on the standard waiting list for cataract surgery.52
The Rawlsian argument here is that the added proﬁts from the contract with the
Zorg & Zekerheid mean that the Diaconessenhuis hospital can expand its service
capacity, making everyone better off.53 Nevertheless, patients in a preferential treat-
ment scheme, or included in commercial mediation, beneﬁt more.
Apart from altering the allocation of health services, the Zvw scheme has caused a
regressive shift in the distribution of premium costs for three reasons. First, the Zvw
introduced a partially ﬁxed premium instead of an income related premium system
48 Daily newspaper Trouw, 25 March 2006.
49 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary proceedings) 2010/11, nr 314.
50 M Buijsen and A den Exter, ‘Equality and the Right to Health Care’ in A den Exter (ed) Human Rights and
Biomedicine (Maklu Press, Antwerpen 2010) 70.
51 Zorgbemiddeling, NZa, Letter to the Minister of Health on commercial mediation (in Dutch), 11 Febru-
ary 2009.
52 Trouw, above, n 48.
53 J Rawls, ATheory of Justice (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1971) 305.
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under the Zfw prior to the 2006 reforms. Secondly, under the Zvw, health insurers
may offer insurance policy options with a limited number of voluntary deductibles
(up to €500). Insured persons receive a discount on their premium in return for
accepting a level of ﬁnancial risk. Thirdly, health insurers can enter into group insur-
ance schemes with employers for employees and their dependents. The discount may
exceed ten per cent of the premium base for each employee or dependent. As a conse-
quence, healthy individuals may now reduce their premiums by accepting a high
deductible in the unlikely event they require care.
It goes without saying that the new health insurance system is designed to see to
the needs of those requiring healthcare (whether afﬂuent or needy). However, the
new scheme serves the wealthy more generously than the poor.
For example, a €350 personal risk (2013 rate) is unlikely to deter those who are
relatively afﬂuent and require healthcare. These individuals will presumably prefer and
can afford a more expensive reimbursement policy. In addition, they will not only take
out supplementary insurance coverage, but also are more likely to be members of
their employer’s group insurance plan and therefore entitled to the maximum
premium discount. In contrast, those with limited ﬁnancial means will be required to
pay the compulsory health insurance contribution; claim a care allowance (i.e. a
subsidy); accept a degree of out-of-pocket payments to reduce their annual premium;
and opt for a beneﬁts in-kind policy. Moreover, they will be unable to afford supple-
mentary insurance coverage, and it is less likely that they can beneﬁt from a large dis-
count as part of group insurance.
Whereas prior to 2006, under the income-related Zfw, premium costs were deter-
mined according to the insured person’s ability to pay, other factors now play a more
decisive role. The waning support for the ability-to-pay principle is being replaced by
the growing importance of factors such as freedom of choice and socio-economic
status. When claims are made that the individual cost of premiums under the Zvw are
more determined by individual choice, it is important to remember that income,
health, and socio-economic circumstances of individuals determine the range of
health insurance options available to them. Under the Zvw, unhealthy and more
needy individuals enjoy less freedom of choice than their healthy and more afﬂuent
counterparts, regardless of how well-informed their health insurance decisions are. If
any freedom of choice remains, their options are limited to choices that conﬂict with
their health care interests. When discussing the right to health care as the right to
access to effective care, the actual access for unhealthy and more needy residents of
the Netherlands is now far more limited in ﬁnancial terms than for their afﬂuent
neighbours.54
2. Freedom of Choice: but not for the Elderly
According to the latest report, consumer exit rates are more or less stable (about 7.2
per cent in 2013), which differs from the beginning (18 per cent in 2006). With the
introduction of the Zvw in 2006, substantial differences in tariffs meant greater ﬁnan-
cial incentives for consumers to change insurer. Currently, the maximum insurance
54 Buijsen and den Exter, above, n 50, 82.
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tariff range is €277.55 Increased consumers’ exit options have resulted in a small
premium reduction of 36 million (‘exit proﬁt’) in 2011.56 Although exit reﬂects the
idea of free choice, it should be noted that its focus is on the younger generation, not
the elderly. Since most insurance companies provide both mandatory and voluntary
health insurance schemes, the elderly are reluctant to change insurer due to entrance
barriers on the voluntary insurance market.
3. Choice of Provider v Cost Containment and Quality of Care
Although individuals’ freedom of choice of provider was one of the leading aims of
the reforms, in 2011, the Ministry of Health concluded a non-binding agreement
(hereafter ‘the Agreement’) with health care stakeholders which restricted choice to
contain hospital costs. The Agreement aims to strengthen the insurers’ purchasing
role in allocating, limiting, and concentrating the volume of hospital care. The under-
lying premise is that quality of care is related to expertise. Speciﬁc interventions will
be concentrated to a limited number of hospitals, since this will be more efﬁcient and
cost-effective and improve the quality of care provided (described as high-volume
contracting). Initial steps have been taken by regional insurers making volume stan-
dards a contractual condition. As expected, hospitals which were not selected argued
that the volume criterion cannot be a decisive factor in deciding not to enter into con-
tracts since there is insufﬁcient scientiﬁc evidence between high-volume contracting
and morbidity rates. Despite the lack of consensus in the CZ v Bethesda hospital case,
the court found that the criterion was lawful.57
Essential for the success of high-volume contracting is that competitors will follow. If
not, the desired concentration will not be established since each of the insurers may
apply different volume standards and/or interpret them differently resulting in different
outcomes. This is an inherent weakness of the Agreement requiring cooperation
between insurers, which may be considered anti-competitive, and therefore not allowed.
The question remains of who should take the lead in this high-volume contracting
process? Leaving it to hospitals will not solve the problem, since they will face the same
problem as insurers.58 Irrespective of the outcome, what remains is a trade-off between
individual’s freedom of choice and cost containment and quality of care. Since selective
contracting has only just started, we can expect further restriction of choice.
4. Risk Selection
The Zvw introduced a highly complex risk equalisation system in order to compen-
sate health insurers for the so-called high-risk insured. This mechanism is intended to
prevent any prohibited risk selection. However, concerns remain about implicit risk
selection by means of marketing strategies focussing on target groups (e.g. academics
and students). This approach is generally considered a niche activity, but in essence it
increases the likelihood of proﬁt since the selected categories reﬂect healthy, young,
and price-conscious consumers. In June 2012, the outcomes of an independent
55 Kamerstukken II (parliamentary Proceedings) 2012/13, 33683, no 3–4, p 17–8.
56 Ibid.
57 District Court Breda 23 November 2010, LNJ BO4755.
58 JJ Rijken, ‘Concentratie van ziekenhuiszorg – iemand moet het doen, maar wie?’ (2011) 7 TvGr 544–59.
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inquiry concerning risk selection by health insurers conﬁrmed low rate practices of
risk selection, undermining the system’s solidarity notion.59 It also conﬁrmed expecta-
tions that this problem will increase when limiting the scope of the basic insurance
plan, which will emphasise the need for additional voluntary insurance plans for the
high-risk insured. Since risk equalisation remains imperfect, the intended risk solidar-
ity and quality of care for certain categories of insured parties will diminish. Unfortu-
nately, the committee’s recommendations may mitigate, but not solve the problem.
This illustrates the trade-off in the system between solidarity and efﬁciency.
5. Merging Insurers: The Big Four
Since 2006, the health insurance market has changed substantially. Starting with
about ﬁfty health insurers, this number has decreased to twenty-six in 2012 divided
over nine insurance companies, of which four dominate the market.60 The high level
of concentration is scrutinised by both the Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Author-
ity for Consumers and Markets) (hereafter ACM)61 and the NZa.
In 2013, the overall increase in annual insurance premium has decreased. This is a
ﬁrst conﬁrmation of the presumption that merges may result in cheaper health care,
despite the tendency of increased health care costs.62
IV. HEALTH CARE COMPETITION IN ENGLAND AND THE
NETHERLANDS: SOME POSSIBLE LESSONS
The foregoing country-speciﬁc analyses illustrate signiﬁcant differences between
England and The Netherlands which make meaningful comparison difﬁcult. Despite
this, there are concerns common to both, e.g. regarding reductions in equal access.
However, the signiﬁcant differences between the Dutch and English health care
systems mean these can arise for different reasons and be dealt with in different ways.
For example, in England, access to care is increasingly subject to local variations,
which appears likely to continue with the transfer of responsibility for health improve-
ment to Local Authorities (with a limited role, but including a legal duty, for the
NHS). Such a change perhaps demonstrates that the link between inequity and com-
petition which has arisen under the Dutch system may be less clear-cut in England
due to wider institutional changes to the NHS under the HSCA 2012. However, it
has been considered that there is both little evidence of choice and competition
acting as a driver of performance in areas including access and equity.63
For the purposes of comparison, there appears to be an interesting trend towards
two speciﬁc policies in both England and The Netherlands which are examined
59 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary proceedings) 2011/12 29689, no 391.
60 NZa, ‘Monitor Toetredingsdrempels Zorgverzekeringsmarkt’. April 2012 <http://www.nza.nl/104107/
105773/475605/Monitor_Toetredingsdrempels_zorgverzekeringsmarkt.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014.
61 Which includes the former Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Dutch Competition Authority) (NMa).
62 An average decrease with 0.6% or €7 source: Zorgthermometer, Vektis April 2013, p 10 <http://www.
vektis.nl/index.php/nieuws/onderzoeken/376-zorgthermometer-verzekerden-in-beweging-2013-verschenen>
accessed 27 March 2014.
63 S Gregory, A Dixon and C Ham (eds), ‘Health Policy under the Coalition Government: A Mid-Term
Assessment’, The King’s Fund, 2012. <http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/health-policy-under-
coalition-government> accessed 28 March 2014.
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below. First, apparent commitments to competition on quality. While this seems
logical in England given a ﬁxed NHS tariff, it is an interesting development in The
Netherlands, where competition on price has also been evident. Secondly, both coun-
tries are developing integrated care policies in the context of healthcare reform.
Despite the distinction between competition and integrated care, both elements arise
from the underlying concept of consumer choice as applied in the Dutch context. For
example, modes of competition may improve consumer choice, whereas integrated
care initiatives may give consumers control over key decisions, allowing people to
have control and autonomy over their own lives, and respecting the personal choices.
This idea of ‘the right to manage one’s own risks’, in particularly relevant for certain
categories of patients such as, e.g., the chronically ill.
A. Consumer Choice and Competition on Quality versus Price
In other sectors, competing on price can produce clear beneﬁts for consumers and gen-
erate efﬁciencies. However in health care, price competition is generally perceived as
undesirable as pursuing proﬁt is thought to lead to a reduction in access and/or quality,
which is not in the public interest. For instance, the introduction of price competition
in dental care in the Netherlands appeared to be a disaster. Initiated as a market experi-
ment, free prices in dental care were introduced in January 2012. As expected, dissolving
maximum prices increased consumers’ freedom of choice, ﬂexibility of treatment
arrangements, and encouraged professional entrepreneurship,64 according to similar
experiences with liberalising physiotherapy prices in 2008. Alarming outcomes of pre-
liminary assessments show a decrease in contracted dental care and increase in tariffs
(on average six per cent), both threatening accessibility and affordability.65 Originally
intended as a three-year experiment, it was annulled in January 2013.66
But the annulment of free dental prices seems contrary to the success of price competi-
tion on the pharmaceutical market. Apart from liberalising pharmacies service fees (January
2013), the strongest effect on purchasing drug prices was the introduction of preferred
drug formulas for the cheapest generic. Since pharmaceutical price regulations (e.g. lower-
ing reimbursement limits, claw-back discount policies, and voluntary price reductions)
have not prevented an increase of pharmaceutical costs, a tendering strategy was intro-
duced. Preferred generics were selected by health insurers by issuing tenders for several
generic drugs. The bidding strategy had a dramatic effect on the generic prices, leading to
substantial savings, i.e. €348 million in 2008.67 It seems, therefore, that health insurers have
gradually developed their role as prudent buyer in the pharmaceutical market.
The opposite outcomes on the health providers market show that price competi-
tion might be successful on certain submarkets where there is a level playing ﬁeld
with transparent prices and comparative alternatives. This seems to be the case when
purchasing medicines by using tendering procedures. In case of scarcity of supply
(e.g. of dentists), price competition will fail.
64 Stcrt (Ofﬁcial Journal) 2011, no 13947, 29 July 2011, p 4.
65 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary proceedings) 2011/12, 32 620, nr 66. Annex, p 4.
66 Stcrt. (Ofﬁcial Journal) 2012, no 14943, 20 July 2012.
67 L Boonen and others, Pharmaceutical Policy in the Netherlands: From Price Regulation towards Managed
Competition, Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research 2010, vol 22, p 67.
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Although market competition should trigger insurers to contract better quality of
care, the outcome of competition on both quality and price is less clear. If quality is
readily detectable, and depending on whether payers are more sensitive to service
quality or price, either better or worse quality is theoretically possible.68
But what lessons are available from the new Dutch health insurance system? Are
insurers effectively steering on quality? One of the underlying premises is that con-
sumers are capable of valuing quality of care and services provided. This is true to a
limited extent: they can value services such as mediation in case of waiting times,
speed of reimbursement, and customer-friendly employees. However, valuing the
quality of care provided remains a subjective affair as objective criteria like sector-wide
outcome indicators are still missing or unreliable.69 The aim of increasing transpar-
ency and contributing to consumers’ informed choices has yet to be realised. The
main problem seems to be the absence of adequate review mechanisms, an extremely
difﬁcult and time-consuming exercise. For that reason, blaming the market seems
unfair. What is needed are sound and feasible indicators. Here, a newly launched
‘Quality Institute’ will play an important role. This Institute will be entrusted with
new tasks regarding quality, safety, and efﬁciency of health care, such as the develop-
ment of an overall quality framework based newly developed and existing professional
standards, and developing quality indicators.70 The absence of reliable output indica-
tors means that purchasing hospital providers are largely inﬂuenced by less rational
motives, e.g. the threat of consumer exit, therefore loss of market share. Effective
health care purchasing is therefore in its infancy.
In England, the controversy surrounding the HSCA 2012 prompted the coalition
government to re-afﬁrm its commitment to competition on quality, not price.
On the one hand, competition on quality is not a new concept within the NHS,
where price competition has been severely restricted by initiatives in the public interest.
One such initiative is the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), which
ensures prices of medicines supplied to the NHS are fair and reasonable. The PPRS has
previously been criticised for indirectly controlling discounts to wholesalers,71 but has
recently been subject to reforms, including a commitment by NHS England seeking to
end initiatives by NHS commissioners to arrange for rebates to be paid by manufacturers
via the commissioning body to NHS service providers in primary or secondary care.72
A further example is Payment by Results (PbR),73 a hospital payment system designed
68 Ofﬁce of Health Economics Commission , ‘Competition In The NHS’ (2012). <http://www.ohe.org/
publications/article/report-of-the-ohe-commission-on-competition-in-the-nhs-108.cfm> accessed 28
March 2014.
69 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary proceedings), 2012–2013, 33585 no 2.
70 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary proceedings), 2011–2012, 33 243, nos 2 and 3.
71 See the OFT Market Study: The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. July 2007. <http://www.oft.
gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft885.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014.
72 Department of Health, ABPI, ‘The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 2014’. <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/282523/Pharmaceutical_Price_Regulation.
pdf> accessed 28 March 2014.
73 For a good overview, see J Appleby and others, ‘Payment by Results: How can payment systems help to
deliver better care?’ November 2012. <http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/ﬁles/kf/ﬁeld/ﬁeld_publication_
ﬁle/payment-by-results-the-kings-fund-nov-2012.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014.
Market Competition in Health Care Markets • 269
to reward efﬁciency, support patient choice, and encourage stronger incentives for
investment.
On the other hand, the HSCA 2012 reinforces the concept of competition on
quality by devolving responsibility away from the Secretary of State for Health. This is
demonstrated clearly in at least two ways.
First, the HSCA 2012 establishes the Health and Social Care Information Centre
(HSCIC),74 whose duties include collecting data about health and social care and estab-
lishing a library of indicators to measure the quality of health and care services provided
to the public.75 In addition, the HSCA 2012 provides that the remit of the National Insti-
tute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)76 is to be extended from producing quality
standards regarding NHS services and public health services to include a new responsibil-
ity to develop quality standards and other guidance for social care in England.77
Secondly, it provides for a consultative relationship between Monitor and the Care
Quality Commission (CQC),78 in a manner reminiscent of—but less well-deﬁned
than—the consultative relationship between the Dutch healthcare and quality regulators
(the NZa and the IGZ).79 It is notable that the Secretary of State for Health has oversight
of both the HSCIC and the CQC (considered an example of the human rights and social
solidarity approach to regulation),80 which contrasts with the independent status of the
economic regulator and competition authority, both of whom include aspects of quality
in their assessments, as noted previously. It has furthermore been noted that ministerial
oversight of the CQC does not preclude mechanisms for direct user involvement,81
something which appears to be on the increase with healthcare-speciﬁc lobby groups.82
The growing dependence on independent agencies to deliver initiatives to bolster
competition on quality can also be seen with regard to pricing for healthcare which,
following the HSCA 2012, becomes a shared responsibility for NHS England and
Monitor. By NHS England specifying healthcare services to be subject to a national
price,83 and Monitor setting that price,84 it is intended that a review of PbR is facili-
tated, as this has been considered insufﬁciently patient-focused.85
The combination of a body whose duties include the establishment of quality indi-
cators (the HSCIC), the extension of NICE’s remit regarding quality standards, and a
statutory relationship between Monitor and the CQC appear to suggest that England
74 HSCA 2012, ss 252–275.
75 HSCIC, ‘Our role’, <http://www.hscic.gov.uk/whoweare> accessed 28 March 2014.
76 Formerly the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE).
77 NICE, ‘NICE Quality Standards’. <http://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/qualitystandards/qualitystandards.
jsp> accessed 28 March 2014.
78 HSCA 2012, ss 288–289.
79 The relationship between the NZa and the IGZ is clearly deﬁned by statute (the Wmg), with the NZa
bound to follow the advice of the IGZ.
80 T Prosser, ‘The Care Quality Commission and its Predecessors’ in T Prosser (ed) The Regulatory Enter-
prise: Government, Regulation and Legitimacy (OUP, Oxford 2010).
81 Ibid.
82 eg internet fora such as <iwantgreatcare.org>.
83 HSCA 2012, s 118(7).
84 HSCA 2012, s 116.
85 NHS England, ‘NHS Payment System’. <http://www.england.nhs.uk/resources/pay-syst/> accessed 28
March 2014.
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is taking a similar approach to The Netherlands in promoting competition on quality,
if not learning directly from the Dutch experience.
B. Integrated Care
It has been considered that while health care reform can see pendulum swings
between competition and integration, the distinction is not as polarised in political
terms between left and right as previously.86 In essence, whereas competition in
health care frequently entails negative connotations of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, integra-
tion can be interpreted as fundamentally good for patients as an effective mechanism
for managing chronic conditions. Indeed, the change in focus over time by govern-
ments from acute to chronic conditions (the former perhaps more amenable to com-
petitive solutions) appears to support the growing, if still fragile, understanding that
competition and integration are not necessarily in conﬂict.87 This can be seen both in
The Netherlands, where bundled payments have been used to promote integrated
care in various conditions since 2010, and England, by the explicit focus of the HSCA
2012 and Monitor on integrated care, particularly its dual functions of facilitating
competition and promoting integrated care.88
In The Netherlands, a tendency towards integrating health providers includes
multidisciplinary arrangements (known as ‘zorggroepen/ketenzorg’, or ‘care groups’)
covering diagnostic services, pharmacy, primary, and secondary care and focusing on
integrated care for conditions such as diabetics, obesity, and COPD. Aimed at providing
more efﬁcient and optimal care, these collaborative arrangements are being used by
health insurers for speciﬁc programmes at a certain price. Integrated care contracts there-
fore may cover both the content (i.e. quality of care) and price. Their control over man-
agement issues, exchange of sensitive information, and anti-competitive foreclosure of
competitors has raised some concerns. As a result, the ACM and NZa have developed
rules to be respected when organising integrated care groups.89 In general, these rules
recognise the need for innovative care arrangements but, simultaneously, such arrange-
ments may not hinder competition on the health provider and purchasing markets.
Contrary to the horizontal integrating of providers, the vertical integration
between the health insurance and delivery functions, however, remains problematic.
The government is considering reintroducing a ban on vertical integration in which a
health insurer merges with, or participates in a hospital.90 Mergers and acquisition
leading to control or decisive inﬂuence of the hospital (e.g. in terms of composition,
voting, or board decisions) will therefore be abolished since these US-style ‘health
maintenance organisation’ (HMO)-based arrangements may give raise to less objec-
tive decision-making about purchasing, threatening doctors’ professional autonomy.
86 C Ham, ‘Competition and Integration in Health Care Reform’ (2012) Int J Integrated Care 12, 15 June
2012.
87 Ibid.
88 Frontier Economics, ‘Enablers and Barriers to Integrated Care and Implications for Monitor. A Report Pre-
pared for Monitor’ May 2012. <http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/home/news-events-publications/
our-publications/browse-category/guidance-health-care-providers-and-co-23> accessed 28 March 2014.
89 NMa en NZa, Richtsnoeren Zorggroepen 2010; NZa. Uitvoeringstoets Mededingingsanalyse zorggroepen.
Samenwerken en concurreren in ketenzorg, juli 2010. <https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/
10739/NMa-en-NZa-publiceren-Richtsnoeren-zorggroepen/> accessed 28 March 2014.
90 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary proceedings) 2011/12 33362, no 2.
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In England, the concept of integration features prominently in the HSCA 2012 at
both national and regional levels: NHS England,91 CCGs, Health and Wellbeing
Boards92 and Monitor all have duties93 to promote integration (in provision of health
care services or working practices) in order to improve the quality (i.e. outcomes or
efﬁciency) of services or reduce inequalities of access or outcomes.94 However, there
appears to be a clear division of effort: commissioners work with local providers to
develop and fund better and more integrated patterns of care, while Monitor will
work with others (particularly commissioners) to remove barriers and enable inte-
grated care provision where this is in the interests of patients.95
In England, the new national frameworks are still in evolution and likely to be
inﬂuenced by future legislation,96 although some lessons are already available from
integrated care pilots launched in different parts of England,97 so some lessons are
already available. For example, while integrated care has been found beneﬁcial for spe-
ciﬁc social groups (e.g. older people), caution is advised in applying integrated care to
single diseases or conditions (e.g. diabetes or dementia) as there is a need to follow
on from focusing on the whole population to avoid creating new silos.98 Moreover, it
has been suggested that mergers (a frequent consequence of introducing competi-
tion) run counter to the breaking down of barriers between services and clinicians,
which generate the main beneﬁts of integrated care.
Further recommendations by The King’s Fund underline Monitor and the OFT’s
roles in supporting integrated care by avoiding inappropriate application of competition
policy to health and social care,99 and the role of appropriate ﬁnancial incentives
(which would necessitate a move away from existing mechanisms such as Payment By
Results).100
In its research so far, Monitor has already looked to The Netherlands to see what
lessons may be available from the Dutch experience of reimbursement and
91 Formerly the NHS Commissioning Board.
92 Health and Wellbeing Boards are fora established by local authorities where key leaders from the health
and care system work together to improve the health and wellbeing of their local population and reduce
health inequalities. <http://healthandcare.dh.gov.uk/hwb-guide/> accessed 28 March 2014.
93 In respect of NHS England’s duty regarding integrated care, HSCA 2012, s 23 inserts ss 13N into the
NHS Act 2006. In respect of CCGs’ duty to promote integrated care, HSCA 2012, s 26 inserts s 14Z1(1)
into the NHS Act 2006. HSCA 2012, s 195 sets out the duty on Health and Wellbeing Boards to promote
integrated care. HSCA 2012, s 62(4) establishes Monitor’s duty to enable provision of integrated care.
94 Monitor, ‘Enabling integrated care’ <http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/regulating-health-care-providers-
commissioners/enabling-integrated-care> accessed 28 March 2014.
95 Ibid.
96 For example the Care Bill (HL Bill 1), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2013-2014/
0001/lbill_2013-20140001_en_4.htm#pt1-pb6-l1g26> accessed 28 March 2014.
97 Some have been reviewed by The Nufﬁeld Trust. C Ham and J Smith, ‘Removing the Policy Barriers to
Integrated Care in England’ The Nufﬁeld Trust Brieﬁng, September 2010. <http://www.nufﬁeldtrust.org.
uk/publications/removing-policy-barriers-integrated-care-england> accessed 28 March 2014.
98 C Ham and N Walsh, ‘Making Integrated Care Happen At Scale and Pace’ The King’s Fund. Lessons
From Experience, March 2013. <http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/making-integrated-care-
happen-scale-and-pace> accessed 28 March 2014.
99 Ibid.
100 C Ham and J Smith, ‘Removing the policy barriers to integrated care in England’ The Nufﬁeld Trust Brief-
ing, September 2010. <http://www.nufﬁeldtrust.org.uk/publications/removing-policy-barriers-integrated-
care-england> accessed 28 March 2014.
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competition.101 It has been suggested, for example, that while introducing bundled
payments for diabetes care in The Netherlands has yielded improvements in both
care delivery processes and transparency of delivered care, antitrust concerns have
arisen in the form of limited choice for patients.102 Additional lessons may be learned
from aspects as diverse as closer cooperation between the ACM and NZa, as noted
above.
V. CONCLUSION
Economic theories on market competition in health care emphasise potential suc-
cesses in terms of increased choice, better quality cost containment, and more efﬁ-
ciency. The Dutch experiences so far, however, are ambivalent if not quite
disappointing. Indeed, in the case of health insurance and pharmaceuticals, competi-
tion on prices has been successful in terms of increased choice and decreasing costs.
At the same time, regulated competition on the health insurance market caused a
retreat from equitable access, making it less effective and more complicated. This was
due to a shift in health policy emphasising selective contracting instead of choice,
ambivalence about price-setting, prohibiting HMO-style initiatives, all of which indi-
cate governmental fear of the market in health care. In a sense, there is a real warning
for England here as unwillingness to leave matters to the market triggers the question
of whether there is a way back. However, the HSCA 2012 reforms might be seen
merely as a logical conclusion to market developments in the NHS so far, and—given
the combined efforts of successive Conservative and Labour governments since the
early 1990s—there seems little mainstream political appetite in England for giving
serious consideration to reversing the changes made.
There appear to be two essential lessons from The Netherlands: the need for a
consistent health policy, and the beneﬁt of competing on quality instead of price. In
addition, there are valuable lessons regarding integrated care initiatives, particularly
with regard to collaboration between different agencies, and competition as a means
for safeguarding equal access to adequate health care services as a basic human right.
These lessons can both beneﬁt from and contribute to a more fundamental discus-
sion and public debate about where markets belong and where they do not—, i.e.
rethinking ‘the proper role of the market in health care’.103 This has also been
acknowledged by economists seeking to progress the debate beyond the binary
options of more or less marketisation.104 Ingredients of this public debate are the
lessons drawn above, including focusing on competition on quality more than price,
differentiating by submarkets, as well as examining the risks of replacing non-market
values (e.g. health, solidarity, and equity) with market reasoning (by emphasising
choice, proﬁt, cost-effectiveness, and cash incentives). As argued by Sandel, such a
debate enables us to decide about the limits—moral and otherwise—of the market.
101 Frontier Economics, above, n 86.
102 JN Struijs and CA Baan, ‘Integrating Care through Bundled Payments—Lessons from The Netherlands’
(2011) 364 (11), 990 (2) NEJM.
103 MJ Sandel, above n 1, 11.
104 T Zuiderent-Jerak, K Grit, and T van der Grinten, ‘Markets and Public Values in Healthcare’ (2010)
iMBG Working Paper W2010.01, <http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19781/Markets%20and%20Public%
20Values%20in%20Healthcare%20.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014.
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